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Early Warning Systems
Bank regulators and others have developed
analytical models that serve as lIearly warning
systems." The aim ofthese models is to identify
the banks that are likely to experience financial
problems. By using the information contained in
the periodic reports of. financial condition that
banks are required to file, these models enable
regulators to conduct lIoff-site" surveillance.
To the extent early warning models accurately
identify potential problem institutions before any
problems actually develop, regulators can target
on-site examination efforts more effectively and
take steps to minimize the drain on the deposit
insurance system should a targeted institution
become insolvent. This Letter discusses the foun-
dation of typical early warning models, their
effectiveness, and some possible improvements.
Identifying problem banks
Bank regulators attempt to identify banks that
are not operating in a safe and sound manner in
order to induce such banks to change their be-
havior or, if a given bank is in danger of failing,
to minimize losses by taking action to close or
reorganize it. In identifying potential problems,
the best information available to regulators comes
from on-site examinations. These examinations,
however, are costly.
Consequently, regulators also attempt to identify
potential problems by developing early warning
models to analyze the information provided in
the periodic reports of condition that banks file.
An early warning model is useful if it reduces the
total costs of bank supervision by allowing reg-
ulators to allocate examination resources more
efficiently and enabling them to identify and
resolve problems more quickly.
In practice, most early warning models aim to
identify the banks that are most likely to become
insolvent over the next interval of time (usually
one or two years). A bank becomes insolvent
when its net worth-the difference between the
values of its assets and liabilities-is completely
exhausted. The rationale for focusing on insol-
vency is that an insolvent bank most likely will
require expenditures by the deposit insurer to
cover the shortfall.
Early warning models
Since the level of a bank's net worth is one of
the most important determinants ofthe proba-
bility of insolvency, all early warning models
include some measure of the current level of net
worth. The other major factor affecting the likeli-
hood of insolvency is the variability of net worth.
A bank that typically experiences large changes
in net worth from one period to the next is more
likely to fail than a bank with lower variability,
given the same level of net worth. The variability
of net worth, in turn, mainly depends on the
variability of returns on the bank's assets. Most
early warning models gauge this "asset risk" by
evaluating the extent to which a given bank
holds a concentration of its assets in the riskier
asset categories.
Many different empirical models have been de-
veloped and tested by regulators and academics
over the past twenty years. In an effort to charac-
terize the level and variability of net worth, each
model relies on a few key variables from among
the many items banks are required to report. Sta-
tistical tests are used to see if the model would
have done an acceptable job of identifying or
ranking the banks that actually were problem
institutions during some recent time period.
The general findings of these models are fairly
consistent. As onewould expect, they have found
that the banks that experience problems during a
given time period tend to begin that period with
relatively low net worth. The models also have
found that problem banks have a higher propor-
tion of assets in the form of loans and a smaller
proportion in the form of more liquid assets,
which seems reasonable since the return on
loans is generally more volatile than the return
on liquid assets. In addition to having a con-
centration of their portfolio in loans, banks that
become problems tend to have riskier loans
within the portfolio, as indicated by a higherFRBSF
level of provisions for bad loans or a higher rate
of loan charge-offs (bad loans actually written
off as losses).
At the same time, most research on early warning
models has found that more detailed information
on the types of loans is not very useful for dis-
tinguishing problem banks from healthy banks,
even though all loans clearly are not equally
risky. Two notable exceptions are a relatively
early model by Paul Meyer and Howard Pifer,
which found that greater concentration in real
estate lending increased the chances of a bank
becoming insolvent, and a more recent model
developed by William Lane and others that indi-
cates that banks concentrating in commercial
lending are more prone to insolvency.
False signals?
Inaccuracy in early warning models arises in two
ways, referred to as "false positives" and "false
negatives:' The difference between the two can
best be illustrated by another type of early warn-
ing system, a household smoke detector. Ifthe
smoke detector is too sensitive, frequent false
alarms result in needless panic and concern,
and may cause a family to give less credence
to the alarm when there actually is a fire; these
false alarms are false positives. On the other
hand, an insensitive smoke detector may fail
to sound an alarm when it should, resulting in
serious damage and loss; this type of failure
is an especially costly false negative.
False positives occur in a bank early warning
model when healthy banks are incorrectly iden-
tified as problems by the model; false negatives
occur when banks become insolvent without
previously having been identified as problems.
False negatives are clearly expensive, and are the
primary motivation for the development of early
warning models. False positives probably are less
expensive, but still waste resources, since devot-
ing resources to closer supervision and exami-
nation of banks that are actually healthy either
raises total supervision costs or leaves less to
be spent on real problems.
Ideally, both kinds of inaccuracy should be
minimized, but in practice there often is a
tradeoff between the two. Consequently, bank
supervisors must weigh the costs imposed by
each type of false signal, and decide on the
tradeoff that is least costly. The rate of false nega-
tives in existing models ranges from 10 percent to
40 percent; that is, early warning systems may
fail to spot as many as 40 percent of the banks
that become problems during any given time
period. A relatively high rate of false positives
generally must be tolerated in order to get the
rate of false negatives down to the 10 percent
range.
Room for improvement
The high rate of false signals in early warning
models suggests substantial room for improve-
ment. There are a number of possible reasons for
the mediocre performance. First, most models
look at the characteristics of banks that actually
became problems during some sample period
chosen by the modeler, and hence focus on the
record of actual losses rather than on their inher-
ent riskiness "ex ante." If some banks are gam-
bling by taking risky positions, they are more
likely to encounter losses. But the nature of gam-
bles is such that at the end of any time period,
some of the gamblers will have lost, while others
will have won. Focusing only on the losers misses
half of the story; an early warning model should
identify all of the gamblers, not just those who
turned out to be unlucky. Using data from a
longer time period would help, but makes it
more likely that other fundamental features of
the banking business will have changed during
the sample period.
Another potential problem is that existing models
commonly gauge asset risk by the types of assets
held by banks. But asset composition alone is not
sufficient to distinguish healthy from unhealthy
banks. The riskiness ofvarious categories of assets
changes over time, as does the extent to which
the risks might offset one another. For example,
models may look at how heavily a bank invests in
a category such as commercial loans, but not at
whether commercial lending has become more
or less risky, or whether commercial loans have
become more or less useful for offsetting the risk
from other activities in which banks engage.
A third weakness of most early warning models
is that they are concerned only with predicting
the development of problems or actual insol-
vency, implicitly assuming that all problem banks
are equally costly. Yet two banks with identical
chances of becoming insolvent during the next
year may impose very different expected costs on
the deposit insurance fund and on the broaderregulatory and financial systems. As a result,
these models may be quite accurate in identify-
ing likely insolvencies but actually end up saving
little money. Not much is known about the true
cost-effectiveness of existing early warning
systems.
More useful warning systems would result from
addressing these three major areas of deficiency.
Better models would identify all of the gamblers,
not just the gamblers that lost. Better models also
would take into account any changes in the con-
tribution various asset categories make to overall
risk. Finally, better models would focus more ex-
plicitly on the objective of regulatory cost savings
by incorporating costs directly.
Using market information
One possible route to such improvements is
to incorporate new and fundamentally different
types of data, such as information derived from
financial market prices or interest rates. Market
prices reflect the consensus views of a very large
group of profit-motivated investors using diverse
approaches to analysis. Bank regulators may be
able to piggy-back on the efforts of these inves-
tors. Like regulators, investors try to evaluate the
condition of banks, and their beliefs are reflected
in the prices at which they are willing to buy and
sell bank-issued securities. Regulators gather su-
perior information when they examine banks, but
examinations are costly and occur relatively in-
frequently; between examinations, the informa-
tion obtained and used by market participants
may be as good as, or better than, the infor-
mation possessed by the regulatory agencies.
For example, declining stock prices at a given
bank may signal that investors perceive problems
at that bank. In one test, Richard Pettway found
that investors began bidding down the stock of
failed banks about two years before the actual
failure, although he did not develop or test a
complete early warning model based on this
result.
An approach based on market-determined prices
therefore is appealing, but a potential drawback
is that the loss in net worth already may be irre-
versible by the time stock prices decline. Useful
early warning models must indicate which banks
are most likely to have problems before the
losses actually occur.
Another possible way to improve early warn-
ing models would be to focus on the variability
of bank stock prices, in addition to their level
and/or trend. A number of the deficiencies of
early warning models noted above could be ad-
dressed in this way. In theory, the variability of
stock prices should be closely related to the vari-
ability of net worth. Variability thus should reflect
the extent to which various banks are gambling
in their operations, and can be estimated without
reference to the historical record of which banks
actually became problems.
Furthermore, the perceptions that cause stock
prices to vary incorporate not only the composi-
tion of bank portfolios, but the market's current
assessment of the contribution of each asset
category to overall risk at the bank. Finally,
combining stock variability with information on
the current level of net worth should enable reg-
ulators to estimate the probability that a given
bank's net worth will fall to zero or below, and
the expected cost if net worth does decline. This
would permit a more explicit focus on regulatory
cost savings. A model based on these concepts is
being developed at the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco.
Cost savings
Early warning models in bank supervision should
continue to improve over time. More accurate
models will reduce the extent to which deposit
insurance funds must be used to deal with insol-
vencies, and hence may help alleviate concerns
about the adequacy of the insurance fund and
the premiums that banks pay. More generally,
better early warning models enhance the overall
effectiveness and efficiency of bank regulation
and supervision, providing greater benefits at
lower cost.
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